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Introduction
According to Wilkinson and The Task Force 
on Statistical Inference (1999), box plots 
should be used more often in research arti-
cles: ‘There are other ways to include data or 
distributions in graphics, including box plots 
… . It is time for authors to take advantage of 
them and for editors and reviewers to urge 
authors to do so’ (p. 607). However, recent 
studies have shown that box plots are not 
easy to interpret at all (e.g., Bakker, Biehler 
& Konold, 2005; Lem, Onghena, Verschaffel 
& Van Dooren, 2012, 2013a, 2013b). Various 
misinterpretations of box plots have been 
reported in high school and university stu-
dents. For example, students think that the 
whiskers do not represent any data, or that 
the middle line represents the mean rather 
than the median. Additionally, they think 
that every value between the minimum and 
maximum has necessarily been observed. 
In this study we investigated the occurrence 
of one specific misinterpretation in expert 
users of box plots, namely that the area of 
the box represents the frequency or propor-
tion of observations, while it actually repre-
sents their density1. Box plots (see Figure 1 
for an example) provide a summary of a data 
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of box plots also display this misinterpretation and show signs of the same heuris-
tic reasoning as found in students. Using a reaction time test, we found signs of 
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are an appropriate form of representation to use when reporting data and deserve 
the prominent place they currently have in the statistics curriculum.
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set using five data points: the minimum, the 
first quartile (Q1), the median, the third quar-
tile (Q3) and the maximum. These five figures 
divide the data set into four intervals contain-
ing more or less the same number of observa-
tions. Looking at the box plot in Figure 1, the 
fact that the 9–18 interval is larger than the 
5–9 interval indicates a relatively low density 
in the 9–18 interval. However, various stud-
ies have shown that students tend to inter-
pret this larger area as representing more 
observations than the smaller area (Bakker 
et al., 2005; Lem et al., 2012, 2013a, 2013b). 
This means that, in Figure 1, students think 
that there are more observations above than 
below the value of nine.
heuristic reasoning
The dual process theoretical framework 
helps to understand why people who in the-
ory possess the required knowledge to solve 
a certain problem may fail to give a correct 
answer due to the impact of heuristic pro-
cessing of certain salient, but not necessarily 
relevant, problem characteristics. Showing 
strong relations to Fischbein’s theory of intu-
itions in mathematical reasoning (Fischbein, 
1987), this framework has also recently been 
applied successfully to mathematics educa-
tion (e.g., Gillard, Van Dooren, Schaeken & 
Verschaffel, 2009; Inglis & Simpson, 2004; 
Leron & Hazzan, 2006; Vamvakoussi, Van 
Dooren & Verschaffel, 2013). According 
to dual process theories of reasoning, one 
tends to use very fast reasoning processes 
— called heuristic processes — by default 
when interpreting a situation or task, and 
only in some cases one will also employ 
slower and more effortful analytic reasoning 
processes. Heuristic reasoning processes very 
frequently lead to the correct solution (the 
heuristic system probably originates and 
survives because of its relative effectiveness 
at high speed with low effort), but analytic 
reasoning is necessary when heuristic rea-
soning is not successful. Many variations of 
dual processing theories of reasoning exist. 
The main difference between the various 
theoretical accounts relates to the way heu-
ristic and analytic reasoning are thought to 
interact. The revised and extended heuris-
tic-analytic model of Evans (2006), which is 
used as the more specific theoretical frame-
work of the present study, combines many of 
these theoretical accounts into one model. 
According to Evans’ model, heuristic and 
analytic reasoning work in constant competi-
tion and interaction with each other. When 
confronted with a task, one will immediately 
and in a heuristic mode start to construct 
the most plausible or relevant default model, 
based on automatically processed salient 
task features, goal and background knowl-
edge. It is only after this initial heuristic pro-
cessing that analytic reasoning may also be 
initiated, depending on many factors such 
as general intelligence, time available and 
the instructions that were given for the task. 
When analytic reasoning takes place, the 
validity of the default model is evaluated 
(based on the amount of cognitive conflict 
experienced) and possibly modified before a 
final response is given.
An important consequence of Evans’ 
extended model is that even when analytic 
thinking takes place, reasoning is still based 
on — and therefore biased by — the default 
model and (possibly irrelevant) salient task 
features. This makes it possible that heuris-
tically processed features still interfere with 
the analytic stage of the reasoning process 
and have an important influence on the final 
outcome of the reasoning. Even experts, who 
are able to correctly solve the mathematical 
tasks at hand, could hence still be influenced 
by intuitions or heuristic reasoning. 
A frequently used method to study heuris-
tic reasoning is the comparison of accuracy 
Figure 1: Example of a box plot.
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and reaction times in tests involving two 
types of items: congruent and incongruent 
items. For congruent items, the correct test 
response is the same as the response that 
would result from the heuristic reasoning 
that is hypothesised, whereas for incongru-
ent items the correct response cannot be 
given on the basis of the hypothesised heu-
ristic reasoning alone but requires additional 
analytic reasoning. This means that one can 
expect higher accuracy for congruent items 
than for incongruent items, while reaction 
times of correct responses to incongruent 
items can be expected to be relatively long, 
as more time-consuming analytic reasoning 
is necessary, compared to congruent items in 
which fast heuristic reasoning suffices. 
We recently conducted two experiments 
that demonstrated the heuristic nature of 
the area misinterpretation of box plots and 
its occurrence among students (Lem et al., 
2013b). In the first experiment, students 
were confronted with situations in which 
they had to compare two box plots (see 
Figure 2 in the Method section for sam-
ple items). Besides accuracy, reaction times 
were logged. As expected, congruent items 
were solved significantly better than incon-
gruent items, and correct responses to con-
gruent items were given significantly faster 
than correct responses to incongruent items, 
suggesting that slower analytic processing 
had to take over to correctly solve incongru-
ent items. In the same experiment, another 
group of students was experimentally 
stimulated to employ analytic reasoning by 
receiving a warning about the misleading 
nature of many graphs and being urged to 
avoid making mistakes as much as possible. 
Surprisingly, although reaction times went 
up in this group, the number of occurrences 
of the area heuristic – leading to errors on 
incongruent items – remained at the same 
level. This suggests that the area heuristic is 
very difficult to overcome, and all the more 
strongly so given that all students scored 
nearly perfectly on a preceding test measur-
ing their factual knowledge about the key 
elements of box plots. We also manipulated 
the extent to which the area of the box was 
salient. In half of the items the area was 
made less salient by giving this area the 
same colour as the background colour, while 
in the other half of the items the area was 
made more salient by colouring it dark grey. 
The accuracy and reaction time patterns indi-
cated a stronger inclination to reason heuris-
tically when the area was made more salient. 
In the second experiment (Lem et al., 2013b), 
students were involved in an experimental 
intervention that was aimed at improving 
their interpretation of box plots and specifi-
cally at eradicating the area heuristic. After 
this intervention, students still showed signs 
of the area heuristic in their accuracy and 
reaction time patterns, including those who 
had scored very high on a preceding box plot 
interpretation test. This further underpins 
the hypothesis that the misinterpretation of 
the box of box plots due to the area heuristic 
is very persistent. A question that arises next 
and that will be addressed in the current 
study is whether it might even still occur in 
expert users of box plots.
Graph design principles
In addition to box plots, many other graphi-
cal representations have been documented 
to be misinterpreted by students, for exam-
ple in mathematics (Acevedo Nistal, Van 
Dooren, Clarebout, Elen & Verschaffel, 2009; 
Yerushalmy, 1991) and in biology (Novick & 
Catley, 2007). Very often, these misinterpre-
tations can be explained by the way people 
perceive graphical representations (e.g., Elby, 
2000). A famous example is given by Bell 
and Janvier (1981), who report on the use of 
an item in which a graph representing the 
speed of a race car as a function of distance 
is presented together with a question asking 
how many turns the car has made. Instead 
of counting the number of times the car has 
slowed down, participants tended to count 
the number of ‘turns’ in the graph.
Tversky (1997) argued that such misinter-
pretations could be avoided if certain prin-
ciples for designing graphs were respected. 
She proposed several graph design principles 
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that stem from the idea that the way we 
interpret graphical representations is based 
on the way we interpret the world. According 
to a first principle, both space and direction 
in graphs should be used in a natural way. 
Because in real life ‘larger’ usually stands for 
‘more’ or ‘better’ (for instance, when making 
a pile of objects the pile becomes larger with 
every extra object added), people are likely 
to interpret a larger area in a graph as rep-
resenting more observations (while, in box 
plots, a larger area actually represents a lower 
density of observations). 
According to another of Tversky’s graph 
design principles, graphs should not use 
more dimensions than the number of 
variables they represent. Histograms use 
two dimensions and both dimensions are 
informative: while one dimension repre-
sents the values taken by the observed varia-
ble, the other represents the frequency with 
which these values have been observed. In 
the case of box plots, however, a two-dimen-
sional box is shown while only the width of 
this box (and of the associated whiskers) is 
actually informative. The very salient sec-
ond dimension of height may give the false 
impression that two variables are shown 
and that the height of the box is important 
too. This principle concerning the restric-
tion of the number of dimensions used in 
a graph to the number of variables repre-
sented has also been proposed by various 
other authors (e.g., Kosslyn, 2006; Robbins, 
2005; Tufte, 1983).
As is clear from the last two sections, the 
misinterpretation of box plots seems to be 
based on the saliency of the area of the box 
and is heuristic in nature. It is for this reason 
that we have referred to this misinterpreta-
tion as the ‘area heuristic’ throughout the 
present article.
Focus of the present study
Research on expertise in various domains 
has revealed that experts focus more on the 
structural principles of a task, while novices 
rely more on its surface features (Hardiman, 
Dufresne & Mestre, 1989; Inglis & Alcock, 
2011; Rabinowitz & Hogan, 2002, 2008). 
An example of this focus on structural prin-
ciples in the domain of statistics can be 
found in a study conducted by Rabinowitz 
and Hogan (2002). University students with 
varying levels of experience in statistics 
had to match various statistical problems 
to each other. While the more experienced 
students focused on more structural fea-
tures of the presented problems (e.g., type 
of test to be used to solve the question), less 
experienced students tended to focus more 
on surface features, like the narrative cover 
story of the problem.
Applying the insights of expert research 
to the topic of the present study, one would 
expect that – unlike students – expert users 
of box plots are no longer hampered by the 
area heuristic, since it relates to a superficial 
feature of box plots. Owing to their extensive 
experience with box plots, experts would be 
assumed to immediately and automatically 
look at the correct task feature, i.e., the posi-
tion of the median, which is also clearly vis-
ible in the box plot. 
However, if experts are still affected by 
the area heuristic, they should show the 
same effects on congruent and incongruent 
items as the students in our previous experi-
ments (Lem et al., 2013b), albeit perhaps to 
a lesser extent. Therefore, if experts perform 
less accurately on incongruent items than on 
congruent ones, or if their response times 
on correctly solved incongruent items are 
longer than on correctly solved congruent 
items, we have to conclude that the area heu-
ristic continues to play a significant role in 
experts’ reasoning processes about box plots. 
The study described in this article was set up 
to look for such evidence of the occurrence 
of the area heuristic in experts.
Method
Participants
The participants were 40 students and staff 
of the KU Leuven who could be considered as 
expert users of box plots. We defined expert 
users of box plots as people who work with 
box plots on a regular basis. This was verified 
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in participants, and they also received a 
box plot knowledge test which asked about 
some factual information regarding the key 
elements in box plots, such as the name of 
these elements (see Lem et al., 2013b). Based 
on this test, we removed five participants 
from our analyses, as they scored 50.0% or 
less. The remaining 35 participants were: 
Figure 2: Overview of the five different item types used. The task was to decide, for each pair 
of box plots representing the exam results of two groups of students, which group had 
most students with a score above 10.
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students of a master’s of statistics program 
(n = 3), researchers in statistics (n = 8), sta-
tistics professors (n = 9), and researchers in 
subfields of psychology, sociology and edu-
cational sciences where box plots are regu-
larly used (n = 15). These participants scored 
on average 95.4% correct on our box plot 
factual knowledge test with a minimum of 
70.0% (n = 2) and a maximum of 100.0% (n 
= 28). Participants were recruited by e-mail 
and participated on a voluntary basis.
Materials
The accuracy and reaction time test was 
exactly the same as the one used in the exper-
iments of Lem et al. (2013b). Participants 
were given 40 items in which two box plots 
representing the fictional exam results of 
two student groups were presented. The 
participants’ task was to determine which of 
the two groups had the most students with a 
mark higher than 10 out of 20. A vertical red 
dotted line was placed in each box plot item 
to indicate the score of 10, in order to assist 
participants in focusing on the comparison 
of the box plots. Five different item types 
were constructed: two congruent item types 
and three incongruent item types. In con-
gruent items the correct response was the 
same as the heuristic response, while these 
two responses differed from each other in 
incongruent items. Examples of the five item 
types, including their correct and heuristic 
responses, are provided in Figure 2. The dif-
ference between the box plots in different 
item types is in the position of the first and 
the third quartiles relative to the median. 
The area of the box was not manipulated in 
any other way. In what follows, we explain 
the different item types and their correct2 
and heuristic responses. 
Congruent equal items presented two iden-
tical box plots: both the correct and the heu-
ristic responses would be that both box plots 
have an equal number of students with exam 
scores above 10. In congruent unequal items, 
the correct response was that one of the box 
plots represented more students with exam 
scores above 10 because the median was 
higher, while heuristic reasoning would lead 
to the choice of the same box plot because 
the area of the box at the right of the line 
marking the 10-score was larger. In incon-
gruent equal items the interquartile range 
of both box plots differed, but the overall 
range was the same. Because the median 
was also the same, there was an equal num-
ber of exam results above and below 10 in 
both box plots. The heuristic response here, 
however, was that one of the box plots had 
more students with exam scores above 10 
because of the larger area of the part of the 
box situated at the right of the line marking 
the 10-score in that box plot. In incongru-
ent unequal items, both box plots had the 
same range and interquartile range, but the 
median was positioned differently. The cor-
rect response was that one of the box plots 
represented more students with exam scores 
above 10, as the median of that box plot was 
higher than 10. Heuristically, however, one 
would think that both box plots represented 
the same number of exam results above 10, 
because the area above 10 was the same in 
both box plots. Finally, incongruent inverse 
items showed two box plots with differently 
positioned medians and different interquar-
tile ranges. The correct response here was 
that one of the box plots presented more 
students with exam scores above 10, while 
the heuristic response was that the other box 
plot had more exam results above 10 given 
the larger area of the box at the right of the 
line marking the 10-score. 
Procedure
The reaction time test was administered indi-
vidually at laptop computers in a controlled 
environment. It started with the presentation 
of a box plot, naming the elements of the box 
plot (minimum, Q1, median, Q3, maximum) 
and reminding participants of the fact that 
the median represents the middle obser-
vation. Next, a general explanation of the 
task was provided, followed by two sample 
items for which participants did not receive 
feedback regarding the correctness of their 
responses. Finally, the task was summarised 
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and participants were told to work at their 
own pace and to try to always provide the cor-
rect response. 
The 40 items were provided in blocks of 10 
items each, followed by a break, which par-
ticipants could end by themselves by tapping 
the space bar. All items were preceded by a 
fixation cross which was presented for 500 
ms. The items were presented in a semi-ran-
dom order, with the following restrictions: (a) 
not more than three consecutive trials with 
the same item type, (b) not more than three 
consecutive trials with the same heuristic 
response, (c) not more than three consecu-
tive trials with the same correct response and 
(d) not more than three consecutive trials 
with the same level of congruency. Stickers 
were placed on keys 9, 6 and 3 of the numeri-
cal keyboard, and participants were asked to 
press key 9 (with sticker reading ‘up’) when 
their answer was ‘top box plot’, key 6 (with 
sticker reading ‘=’) when the answer was 
‘both the same’, or key 3 (with sticker read-
ing ‘down’) when their answer was ‘lower box 
plot’. For each item, the participants’ reac-
tion time and accuracy were logged.
analysis
Before analysing the data, the reaction times 
were log-transformed in order to normalise 
their distribution. Furthermore, all trials 
with a reaction time more than 2.5 stand-
ard deviations from the mean, as calculated 
within each level of congruency, were consid-
ered outliers and were therefore not used in 
the analyses, resulting in the deletion of 22 
(1.57%) trials. 
Because our data are clustered, or to state 
it differently, involve multiple measurements 
per participant, we opted for multilevel analy-
ses. Multilevel models take into account the 
possible correlation between the different 
responses of a single participant (Van den 
Noortgate & Onghena, 2006). For the analy-
sis of the accuracy rates we used generalized 
linear mixed models (which can be seen as an 
extension of logistic regression analysis) with a 
dichotomous dependent variable (McCulloch 
& Searle, 2001). For the analysis of the reac-
tion times we resorted to linear mixed mod-
els, because of the continuous nature of the 
dependent variable (Verbeke & Molenberghs, 
1997). SAS 9.3 was used for all analyses.
Results
Accuracy for the congruent items was 97.8% 
and it was 95.2% for the incongruent items. 
A generalized linear mixed model, with accu-
racy as dependent variable and congruency 
as independent variable, showed a main 
effect of congruency on accuracy, F(1, 1342) 
= 7.16, p = .008, OR = 2.58. This finding 
Figure 3: Accuracy rates and number of heuristic responses per item type, in percentages.
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indicates that experts are still affected by 
the area heuristic, although the effect is rela-
tively small, with a difference of only 2.6% 
between both item types. We also found that 
75.0% of all incorrect responses to the incon-
gruent items corresponded to the heuristic 
response. Both the accuracy rates and the 
percentages of heuristic responses per item 
type are displayed in Figure 3.
Using a linear mixed model, the effect of 
congruency on reaction times for correct 
responses was analysed. We found a main 
effect of congruency, with longer reaction 
times for correct responses to incongruent 
items (4179 ms, SD = 4892.10) than for cor-
rect responses to congruent items (3734 ms, 
SD = 3534.01), F(1, 1290) = 4.23, p = .040, 
Cohen’s d = 0.10. This effect is rather small 
according to Cohen’s (1988) classification. 
However, this main effect of congruency on 
reaction times still indicates that experts 
need more time to correctly solve incongru-
ent items than to correctly solve congru-
ent items. This effect again points out that 
experts are affected by the area heuristic, 
just like novices are, although it also indi-
cates that they are better able to overrule it 
by analytic reasoning.
conclusion and Discussion
Lem et al. (2013b) showed that university stu-
dents misinterpret box plots due to the heu-
ristic processing of the area of the box, which 
we termed the area heuristic. In this study 
we used the same technique to test whether 
people who can be considered as expert 
users of box plots still show signs of such an 
area heuristic. Both the accuracy rates and 
reaction times in our results show that the 
area heuristic is not completely eradicated 
even in expert users of box plots. The accu-
racy rates revealed that experts sometimes 
still make the same mistakes as students. The 
reaction time data indicate that even when 
correct responses are given, experts first have 
to overrule the incorrect response previously 
generated by the area heuristic. It is the dem-
onstration of this last mechanism that is an 
especially important finding with important 
implications, as will be discussed below in 
more detail.
Comparing our results with those of Lem 
et al.’s (2013b) experiment with novices, we 
can draw three important conclusions. First, 
accuracy is notably higher with experts as 
compared to novices: experts gave 97.8% 
correct responses for congruent items com-
pared to 90.4% for the novices in Lem et al.’s 
(2013b) study, and 95.2% correct responses 
for incongruent items compared to only 
63.0% for the novices. Second, a statistically 
significant difference in accuracy between 
congruent and incongruent items was still 
found for the experts just like it was already 
found for novice users of box plots (Lem et 
al., 2013b). Although this difference might 
seem very small and without immediate 
practical relevance, it still shows the same 
effect of congruency as with the students 
and hence provides a first important piece 
of evidence that the area heuristic is still 
not totally eradicated in expert users of box 
plots. The fact that we found this effect even 
though the experts knew their reasoning 
was being investigated, most probably mak-
ing them more cautious, makes it even more 
plausible that they would also be prone to 
making the heuristic misinterpretation 
when less cautious, such as when looking 
at box plots while reading a research paper. 
Third, the difference in reaction times for 
correct responses to congruent and incon-
gruent items was significant in experts in the 
same way as it was in the novices studied by 
Lem et al. (2013b). This is a second piece of 
evidence for the persistence of the area heu-
ristic in experts. 
We can conclude that even expert users 
of box plots are not immune to the fast, 
incorrect interpretation of the area of the 
box as representing frequency or propor-
tion of observations. We do see, however, 
that expert users are better able to overcome 
this first heuristic interpretation by reason-
ing analytically. One may argue that in eve-
ryday practice, the reaction time difference 
observed between correct responses to con-
gruent and incongruent items is negligible. 
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Nevertheless, these reaction times indi-
cate that expert users of box plots are still 
affected by the area heuristic and that, as a 
consequence, in certain circumstances – for 
example when under time pressure or when 
distracted – they may still commit heuristic 
errors. (This actually occurred in our experi-
ment, where there was a lower accuracy for 
incongruent items as compared to congruent 
items). Furthermore, this study showed that 
this specific heuristic is very persistent; even 
when one is able to correctly interpret box 
plots, the incorrect reasoning mechanism 
still plays a role in the reasoning process. 
Two important limitations of the current 
study, however, are the heterogeneous com-
position of the group of participants and the 
relatively small sample size. A larger sam-
ple size (e.g., more participants in each sub 
group), would allow for the study of the dif-
ferences between statisticians and research-
ers in other subjects, for example. This could 
be the goal of future research.
The results of this study have important 
implications, both with respect to the use of 
box plots in scientific reports and their role 
in statistics education. With respect to box 
plots in scientific reports, we can contest the 
advice of Wilkinson and The Task Force on 
Statistical Inference (1999) to use box plots 
in research articles. Our results show that 
even expert users are to some extent con-
fused by this representation, especially when 
interpreting box plots swiftly. Moreover, 
it is very well possible that authors do not 
use box plots correctly themselves. With 
respect to the role of box plots in the sta-
tistics curriculum, two arguments can be 
made. On the one hand, it could be argued 
that if box plots are so problematic even for 
experts, one might consider removing them 
from the statistics curriculum in addition to 
abandoning them from research reports. On 
the other hand, if the scientific community 
continues to value and use box plots, it is 
clear that more time should be given to the 
instruction of students with regards to this 
graphical representation. Moreover, research 
into new methods for teaching box plots, 
such as the use of multiple representations 
(e.g., Ainsworth, 2011) or the use of alter-
native designs of box plots (Tufte, 1983), is 
necessary as we have shown that the current 
teaching methods are apparently not suc-
cessful enough. Some of the many design 
additions and extensions that have been pro-
posed in the last decades (for an overview, 
see Wickham & Stryjewski, 2011) could also 
enable a better interpretation of box plots. 
However, these plots are usually much more 
complex to construct and are in some cases 
hardly recognisable as box plots anymore. 
Moreover, it should be empirically tested 
whether these additions and extensions 
indeed improve interpretation. 
Notes
 1 By ‘density’ we mean the relative spread 
of the data within each interval.
 2 We are aware that, because we chose dis-
crete exam scores (between 0 and 20) of 
a rather small group of fictional partici-
pants as context for our test, it is in prin-
ciple possible, to construct data sets for 
the given box plots in some items used 
in our study that would match any of the 
answering alternatives by including an 
extreme number of ties at specific values 
of the variable under consideration. 
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